Metaphysics - Revision history

Wordpad: BloomWiki: Metaphysics

2026-04-25T01:53:59Z

BloomWiki: Metaphysics

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:53, 25 April 2026
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			<div style="background-color: #4B0082; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
	{{BloomIntro}}		{{BloomIntro}}
	Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the most fundamental features of reality: what exists, what kinds of things there are, and what their basic properties and relations are. Where science investigates particular domains of nature, metaphysics asks the prior questions: What is existence itself? What is the relationship between mind and matter? Do abstract objects like numbers and properties exist? What makes things persist through time? What grounds causation? These questions cannot be settled by empirical investigation alone — they concern the framework within which any investigation occurs. Metaphysics is not mere speculation; it is rigorous inquiry into the deepest structure of reality, with consequences for science, ethics, and our understanding of ourselves.		Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the most fundamental features of reality: what exists, what kinds of things there are, and what their basic properties and relations are. Where science investigates particular domains of nature, metaphysics asks the prior questions: What is existence itself? What is the relationship between mind and matter? Do abstract objects like numbers and properties exist? What makes things persist through time? What grounds causation? These questions cannot be settled by empirical investigation alone — they concern the framework within which any investigation occurs. Metaphysics is not mere speculation; it is rigorous inquiry into the deepest structure of reality, with consequences for science, ethics, and our understanding of ourselves.
			</div>

	== Remembering ==		__TOC__

			<div style="background-color: #000080; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Remembering</span> ==
	* '''Metaphysics''' — The philosophical study of the fundamental nature of reality; includes ontology, the study of being.		* '''Metaphysics''' — The philosophical study of the fundamental nature of reality; includes ontology, the study of being.
	* '''Ontology''' — The study of what exists and what kinds of entities there are; a subdiscipline within metaphysics.		* '''Ontology''' — The study of what exists and what kinds of entities there are; a subdiscipline within metaphysics.
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	* '''Possible worlds''' — Philosophical device for analyzing possibility and necessity; David Lewis's modal realism.		* '''Possible worlds''' — Philosophical device for analyzing possibility and necessity; David Lewis's modal realism.
	* '''Personal identity''' — What makes a person the same person over time; psychological continuity vs. biological continuity.		* '''Personal identity''' — What makes a person the same person over time; psychological continuity vs. biological continuity.
			</div>

	== Understanding ==		<div style="background-color: #006400; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Understanding</span> ==
	Metaphysics is organized around several interconnected debates, each of which touches the others:		Metaphysics is organized around several interconnected debates, each of which touches the others:

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	'''Personal identity''': What makes you the same person you were at age five? The body has changed almost entirely. John Locke proposed psychological continuity — what makes you the same person is continuity of consciousness and memory. Derek Parfit radicalized this: personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity, which can branch (in fission cases). This has profound implications for ethics (punishment, promises, self-interest over time).		'''Personal identity''': What makes you the same person you were at age five? The body has changed almost entirely. John Locke proposed psychological continuity — what makes you the same person is continuity of consciousness and memory. Derek Parfit radicalized this: personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity, which can branch (in fission cases). This has profound implications for ethics (punishment, promises, self-interest over time).
			</div>

	== Applying ==		<div style="background-color: #8B0000; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Applying</span> ==
	'''Formalizing metaphysical claims with modal logic:'''		'''Formalizing metaphysical claims with modal logic:'''
	<syntaxhighlight lang="python">		<syntaxhighlight lang="python">
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	: '''Personal identity''' → Locke (memory), Hume (bundle theory), Parfit (''Reasons and Persons''), Olson (animalism)		: '''Personal identity''' → Locke (memory), Hume (bundle theory), Parfit (''Reasons and Persons''), Olson (animalism)
	: '''Modal metaphysics''' → Kripke (''Naming and Necessity''), Lewis (modal realism), Plantinga (ersatz worlds)		: '''Modal metaphysics''' → Kripke (''Naming and Necessity''), Lewis (modal realism), Plantinga (ersatz worlds)
			</div>

	== Analyzing ==		<div style="background-color: #8B4500; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Analyzing</span> ==
	{\| class="wikitable"		{\| class="wikitable"
	\|+ Theories of Mind and Their Trade-offs		\|+ Theories of Mind and Their Trade-offs
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	'''Classic puzzles and thought experiments''': The zombie argument (Chalmers): conceivable that beings physically identical to us lack consciousness → physicalism is false. Mary's Room (Jackson): Mary knows all physical facts about color but learns something new on seeing red → physicalism is false. Teleporter paradox: if your body is disassembled and reassembled elsewhere, is it still you? The ship of Theseus: as parts are replaced one by one, at what point does the ship cease to be the same ship?		'''Classic puzzles and thought experiments''': The zombie argument (Chalmers): conceivable that beings physically identical to us lack consciousness → physicalism is false. Mary's Room (Jackson): Mary knows all physical facts about color but learns something new on seeing red → physicalism is false. Teleporter paradox: if your body is disassembled and reassembled elsewhere, is it still you? The ship of Theseus: as parts are replaced one by one, at what point does the ship cease to be the same ship?
			</div>

	== Evaluating ==		<div style="background-color: #483D8B; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Evaluating</span> ==
	Metaphysical theories are evaluated through:		Metaphysical theories are evaluated through:
	# '''Parsimony''': does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor.		# '''Parsimony''': does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor.
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	# and		# and
	# drives much metaphysical debate.		# drives much metaphysical debate.
			</div>

	== Creating ==		<div style="background-color: #2F4F4F; color: #FFFFFF; padding: 20px; border-radius: 8px; margin-bottom: 15px;">
			== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Creating</span> ==
	Doing metaphysics at the research frontier:		Doing metaphysics at the research frontier:
	# '''Grounding''': explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics.		# '''Grounding''': explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics.
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	[[Category:Metaphysics]]		[[Category:Metaphysics]]
	[[Category:Ontology]]		[[Category:Ontology]]
			</div>

Wordpad: BloomWiki: Metaphysics

2026-04-23T14:36:36Z

BloomWiki: Metaphysics

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:36, 23 April 2026
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	== Evaluating ==		== Evaluating ==
	Metaphysical theories are evaluated through: ~~(1)~~ '''Parsimony''': does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor. ~~(2)~~ '''Explanatory power''': does it explain more facts than competitors? ~~(3)~~ '''Coherence''': is the theory internally consistent? ~~(4)~~ '''Intuitive adequacy''': does it respect strong pre-theoretical intuitions? ~~(5)~~ '''Scientific compatibility''': is it consistent with what our best sciences tell us? The tension between ~~(4)~~ and ~~(5)~~ drives much metaphysical debate.		Metaphysical theories are evaluated through:
			# '''Parsimony''': does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor.
			# '''Explanatory power''': does it explain more facts than competitors?
			# '''Coherence''': is the theory internally consistent?
			# '''Intuitive adequacy''': does it respect strong pre-theoretical intuitions?
			# '''Scientific compatibility''': is it consistent with what our best sciences tell us? The tension between
			# and
			# drives much metaphysical debate.

	== Creating ==		== Creating ==
	Doing metaphysics at the research frontier: ~~(1)~~ '''Grounding''': explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics. ~~(2)~~ '''Metaontology''': following Quine and van Inwagen, asking what our ontological commitments really are, and what methodology should govern ontological disputes. ~~(3)~~ '''Naturalized metaphysics''': using results from physics (quantum mechanics), biology (species concepts), and neuroscience (consciousness) to constrain metaphysical theorizing. ~~(4)~~ '''Applied metaphysics''': metaphysics of race, gender, disability — real-world implications of ontological choices. ~~(5)~~ Connecting personal identity theory to bioethics, advance directives, and dementia.		Doing metaphysics at the research frontier:
			# '''Grounding''': explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics.
			# '''Metaontology''': following Quine and van Inwagen, asking what our ontological commitments really are, and what methodology should govern ontological disputes.
			# '''Naturalized metaphysics''': using results from physics (quantum mechanics), biology (species concepts), and neuroscience (consciousness) to constrain metaphysical theorizing.
			# '''Applied metaphysics''': metaphysics of race, gender, disability — real-world implications of ontological choices.
			# Connecting personal identity theory to bioethics, advance directives, and dementia.

	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]
	[[Category:Metaphysics]]		[[Category:Metaphysics]]
	[[Category:Ontology]]		[[Category:Ontology]]

Wordpad: BloomWiki: Metaphysics

2026-04-23T14:21:21Z

BloomWiki: Metaphysics

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:21, 23 April 2026
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	Metaphysics is organized around several interconnected debates, each of which touches the others:		Metaphysics is organized around several interconnected debates, each of which touches the others:

	The mind-body problem: The most pressing metaphysical problem of our time. Descartes proposed substance dualism: the mind (''res cogitans'') and body (''res extensa'') are entirely different kinds of substance. This faces the interaction problem: how do non-physical minds causally affect physical bodies? Physicalism — the dominant contemporary view — holds that the mental is in some sense physical. But the "hard problem of consciousness" (David Chalmers) remains: even if we fully explain the neural correlates of experience, we haven't explained why there is subjective experience at all — why it feels like something to see red.		'''The mind-body problem''': The most pressing metaphysical problem of our time. Descartes proposed substance dualism: the mind (''res cogitans'') and body (''res extensa'') are entirely different kinds of substance. This faces the interaction problem: how do non-physical minds causally affect physical bodies? Physicalism — the dominant contemporary view — holds that the mental is in some sense physical. But the "hard problem of consciousness" (David Chalmers) remains: even if we fully explain the neural correlates of experience, we haven't explained why there is subjective experience at all — why it feels like something to see red.

	Universals and abstract objects: Does redness exist independently of red things? Do numbers exist? Plato's answer (universals are eternal, mind-independent Forms) is intuitive but raises metaphysical puzzles: where are the Forms? How do we access them? Nominalism denies universals exist; only particular red things exist, and "redness" is merely a label we apply to them. Moderate realism (Aristotle) holds that universals exist but only in particular things that instantiate them. The status of mathematical objects is a particular battleground: Platonism in mathematics says numbers exist necessarily; fictionalism says mathematical statements are useful fictions.		'''Universals and abstract objects''': Does redness exist independently of red things? Do numbers exist? Plato's answer (universals are eternal, mind-independent Forms) is intuitive but raises metaphysical puzzles: where are the Forms? How do we access them? Nominalism denies universals exist; only particular red things exist, and "redness" is merely a label we apply to them. Moderate realism (Aristotle) holds that universals exist but only in particular things that instantiate them. The status of mathematical objects is a particular battleground: Platonism in mathematics says numbers exist necessarily; fictionalism says mathematical statements are useful fictions.

	Causation: We experience causation everywhere, but what is it metaphysically? Hume's regularity theory: causation is just constant conjunction — A is regularly followed by B. But this seems to miss something: there must be a necessary connection. Counterfactual theories (Lewis): A caused B iff, had A not occurred, B would not have occurred. Necessitation theories: causes necessitate their effects through natural laws. Each account faces difficulties: regularity theory misses asymmetry and accidental regularities; counterfactual theory faces problems with overdetermination.		'''Causation''': We experience causation everywhere, but what is it metaphysically? Hume's regularity theory: causation is just constant conjunction — A is regularly followed by B. But this seems to miss something: there must be a necessary connection. Counterfactual theories (Lewis): A caused B iff, had A not occurred, B would not have occurred. Necessitation theories: causes necessitate their effects through natural laws. Each account faces difficulties: regularity theory misses asymmetry and accidental regularities; counterfactual theory faces problems with overdetermination.

	Personal identity: What makes you the same person you were at age five? The body has changed almost entirely. John Locke proposed psychological continuity — what makes you the same person is continuity of consciousness and memory. Derek Parfit radicalized this: personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity, which can branch (in fission cases). This has profound implications for ethics (punishment, promises, self-interest over time).		'''Personal identity''': What makes you the same person you were at age five? The body has changed almost entirely. John Locke proposed psychological continuity — what makes you the same person is continuity of consciousness and memory. Derek Parfit radicalized this: personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity, which can branch (in fission cases). This has profound implications for ethics (punishment, promises, self-interest over time).

	== Applying ==		== Applying ==
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	== Evaluating ==		== Evaluating ==
	Metaphysical theories are evaluated through: (1) Parsimony: does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor. (2) Explanatory power: does it explain more facts than competitors? (3) Coherence: is the theory internally consistent? (4) Intuitive adequacy: does it respect strong pre-theoretical intuitions? (5) Scientific compatibility: is it consistent with what our best sciences tell us? The tension between (4) and (5) drives much metaphysical debate.		Metaphysical theories are evaluated through: (1) '''Parsimony''': does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor. (2) '''Explanatory power''': does it explain more facts than competitors? (3) '''Coherence''': is the theory internally consistent? (4) '''Intuitive adequacy''': does it respect strong pre-theoretical intuitions? (5) '''Scientific compatibility''': is it consistent with what our best sciences tell us? The tension between (4) and (5) drives much metaphysical debate.

	== Creating ==		== Creating ==
	Doing metaphysics at the research frontier: (1) Grounding: explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics. (2) Metaontology: following Quine and van Inwagen, asking what our ontological commitments really are, and what methodology should govern ontological disputes. (3) Naturalized metaphysics: using results from physics (quantum mechanics), biology (species concepts), and neuroscience (consciousness) to constrain metaphysical theorizing. (4) Applied metaphysics: metaphysics of race, gender, disability — real-world implications of ontological choices. (5) Connecting personal identity theory to bioethics, advance directives, and dementia.		Doing metaphysics at the research frontier: (1) '''Grounding''': explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics. (2) '''Metaontology''': following Quine and van Inwagen, asking what our ontological commitments really are, and what methodology should govern ontological disputes. (3) '''Naturalized metaphysics''': using results from physics (quantum mechanics), biology (species concepts), and neuroscience (consciousness) to constrain metaphysical theorizing. (4) '''Applied metaphysics''': metaphysics of race, gender, disability — real-world implications of ontological choices. (5) Connecting personal identity theory to bioethics, advance directives, and dementia.

	[[Category:Philosophy]]		[[Category:Philosophy]]
	[[Category:Metaphysics]]		[[Category:Metaphysics]]
	[[Category:Ontology]]		[[Category:Ontology]]

Wordpad: BloomWiki: Metaphysics

2026-04-23T13:04:00Z

BloomWiki: Metaphysics

New page

{{BloomIntro}}
Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the most fundamental features of reality: what exists, what kinds of things there are, and what their basic properties and relations are. Where science investigates particular domains of nature, metaphysics asks the prior questions: What is existence itself? What is the relationship between mind and matter? Do abstract objects like numbers and properties exist? What makes things persist through time? What grounds causation? These questions cannot be settled by empirical investigation alone — they concern the framework within which any investigation occurs. Metaphysics is not mere speculation; it is rigorous inquiry into the deepest structure of reality, with consequences for science, ethics, and our understanding of ourselves.

== Remembering ==
* '''Metaphysics''' — The philosophical study of the fundamental nature of reality; includes ontology, the study of being.
* '''Ontology''' — The study of what exists and what kinds of entities there are; a subdiscipline within metaphysics.
* '''Substance''' — A fundamental, independently existing entity; what persists through change.
* '''Property''' — A feature or characteristic of a substance; the redness of a rose, the mass of an electron.
* '''Universals''' — Properties, relations, or kinds that can be shared by multiple particulars; the debate: do they exist independently?
* '''Nominalism''' — The view that only particulars exist; universals are mere names or conceptual categories.
* '''Realism (metaphysical)''' — The view that some entities (universals, numbers, moral facts) exist independently of minds.
* '''Mind-body problem''' — The puzzle of how mental states relate to physical states; arguably the deepest problem in metaphysics.
* '''Dualism''' — The view that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct substances; Descartes.
* '''Physicalism (materialism)''' — The view that everything that exists is physical or supervenes on the physical.
* '''Identity theory''' — Mental states are identical to brain states; pain IS a particular neural firing pattern.
* '''Functionalism''' — Mental states are defined by their functional roles (inputs, outputs, relations to other states), not by their physical substrate.
* '''Causation''' — The relation between cause and effect; accounts include: regularity theory, counterfactual theory, necessitation.
* '''Modality''' — Concerned with possibility and necessity; modal logic; possible worlds semantics.
* '''Possible worlds''' — Philosophical device for analyzing possibility and necessity; David Lewis's modal realism.
* '''Personal identity''' — What makes a person the same person over time; psychological continuity vs. biological continuity.

== Understanding ==
Metaphysics is organized around several interconnected debates, each of which touches the others:

**The mind-body problem**: The most pressing metaphysical problem of our time. Descartes proposed substance dualism: the mind (''res cogitans'') and body (''res extensa'') are entirely different kinds of substance. This faces the interaction problem: how do non-physical minds causally affect physical bodies? Physicalism — the dominant contemporary view — holds that the mental is in some sense physical. But the "hard problem of consciousness" (David Chalmers) remains: even if we fully explain the neural correlates of experience, we haven't explained why there is subjective experience at all — why it feels like something to see red.

**Universals and abstract objects**: Does redness exist independently of red things? Do numbers exist? Plato's answer (universals are eternal, mind-independent Forms) is intuitive but raises metaphysical puzzles: where are the Forms? How do we access them? Nominalism denies universals exist; only particular red things exist, and "redness" is merely a label we apply to them. Moderate realism (Aristotle) holds that universals exist but only in particular things that instantiate them. The status of mathematical objects is a particular battleground: Platonism in mathematics says numbers exist necessarily; fictionalism says mathematical statements are useful fictions.

**Causation**: We experience causation everywhere, but what is it metaphysically? Hume's regularity theory: causation is just constant conjunction — A is regularly followed by B. But this seems to miss something: there must be a necessary connection. Counterfactual theories (Lewis): A caused B iff, had A not occurred, B would not have occurred. Necessitation theories: causes necessitate their effects through natural laws. Each account faces difficulties: regularity theory misses asymmetry and accidental regularities; counterfactual theory faces problems with overdetermination.

**Personal identity**: What makes you the same person you were at age five? The body has changed almost entirely. John Locke proposed psychological continuity — what makes you the same person is continuity of consciousness and memory. Derek Parfit radicalized this: personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity, which can branch (in fission cases). This has profound implications for ethics (punishment, promises, self-interest over time).

== Applying ==
'''Formalizing metaphysical claims with modal logic:'''
<syntaxhighlight lang="python">
# Metaphysics uses modal logic to formalize possibility/necessity claims
# □P = "Necessarily P" (P is true in all possible worlds)
# ◇P = "Possibly P" (P is true in at least one possible world)

# We can simulate possible worlds reasoning computationally

class World:
"""A possible world with specific facts about it."""
def __init__(self, name: str, facts: dict):
self.name = name
self.facts = facts # {'proposition': bool}

def is_true(self, proposition: str) -> bool:
return self.facts.get(proposition, False)

class ModalModel:
"""Kripke model for modal logic: worlds + accessibility relation."""
def __init__(self):
self.worlds: dict[str, World] = {}
self.accessibility: dict[str, set[str]] = {} # w → {accessible worlds}

def add_world(self, world: World, accessible_from: list[str] = None):
self.worlds[world.name] = world
self.accessibility[world.name] = set()
if accessible_from:
for w in accessible_from:
if w in self.accessibility:
self.accessibility[w].add(world.name)

def necessarily(self, proposition: str, from_world: str) -> bool:
"""□P: true in all accessible worlds."""
return all(self.worlds[w].is_true(proposition)
for w in self.accessibility[from_world]
if w in self.worlds)

def possibly(self, proposition: str, from_world: str) -> bool:
"""◇P: true in at least one accessible world."""
return any(self.worlds[w].is_true(proposition)
for w in self.accessibility[from_world]
if w in self.worlds)

# Example: Is "water is H₂O" a necessary truth? (Kripke's essential properties)
model = ModalModel()
actual = World("actual", {"water_is_H2O": True, "gold_is_element": True, "I_exist": True})
w1 = World("w1", {"water_is_H2O": True, "gold_is_element": True, "I_exist": False})
w2 = World("w2", {"water_is_H2O": True, "gold_is_element": True, "I_exist": True})
# Note: in w2, 'water' might be a different substance, but it still IS H₂O in our sense

model.worlds["actual"] = actual
model.accessibility["actual"] = {"w1", "w2"}
model.worlds["w1"] = w1
model.worlds["w2"] = w2

print(f"'Water is H₂O' necessarily: {model.necessarily('water_is_H2O', 'actual')}")
# Kripke argues: yes, necessary a posteriori — discovered empirically but true in all worlds
print(f"'I exist' necessarily: {model.necessarily('I_exist', 'actual')}")
# No: there are possible worlds where I don't exist
</syntaxhighlight>

; Key metaphysical debates and theorists
: '''Mind-body''' → Descartes (dualism), Smart & Place (identity theory), Putnam (functionalism), Chalmers (hard problem), Dennett (eliminativism)
: '''Universals''' → Plato (Forms), Aristotle (immanent realism), Quine (nominalism), Armstrong (universals as relations)
: '''Causation''' → Hume (regularity), Lewis (counterfactual), Armstrong (necessitation), Mackie (INUS conditions)
: '''Personal identity''' → Locke (memory), Hume (bundle theory), Parfit (''Reasons and Persons''), Olson (animalism)
: '''Modal metaphysics''' → Kripke (''Naming and Necessity''), Lewis (modal realism), Plantinga (ersatz worlds)

== Analyzing ==
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Theories of Mind and Their Trade-offs
! Theory !! Mental = !! Explains Qualia !! Causal Efficacy || Multiple Realizability
|-
| Substance dualism || Non-physical substance || Yes || Interaction problem || Yes
|-
| Identity theory || Brain state tokens || Poorly || Yes || No (too restrictive)
|-
| Functionalism || Functional role || Incompletely || Yes || Yes
|-
| Eliminativism || Doesn't exist (folk psychology is false) || Dissolves problem || Yes || N/A
|-
| Property dualism || Physical substance, non-physical properties || Yes || Epiphenomenalism risk || Yes
|}

'''Classic puzzles and thought experiments''': The zombie argument (Chalmers): conceivable that beings physically identical to us lack consciousness → physicalism is false. Mary's Room (Jackson): Mary knows all physical facts about color but learns something new on seeing red → physicalism is false. Teleporter paradox: if your body is disassembled and reassembled elsewhere, is it still you? The ship of Theseus: as parts are replaced one by one, at what point does the ship cease to be the same ship?

== Evaluating ==
Metaphysical theories are evaluated through: (1) **Parsimony**: does the theory posit only what is needed? Occam's razor. (2) **Explanatory power**: does it explain more facts than competitors? (3) **Coherence**: is the theory internally consistent? (4) **Intuitive adequacy**: does it respect strong pre-theoretical intuitions? (5) **Scientific compatibility**: is it consistent with what our best sciences tell us? The tension between (4) and (5) drives much metaphysical debate.

== Creating ==
Doing metaphysics at the research frontier: (1) **Grounding**: explaining not just correlation but what makes one fact hold in virtue of another — structural metaphysics. (2) **Metaontology**: following Quine and van Inwagen, asking what our ontological commitments really are, and what methodology should govern ontological disputes. (3) **Naturalized metaphysics**: using results from physics (quantum mechanics), biology (species concepts), and neuroscience (consciousness) to constrain metaphysical theorizing. (4) **Applied metaphysics**: metaphysics of race, gender, disability — real-world implications of ontological choices. (5) Connecting personal identity theory to bioethics, advance directives, and dementia.

[[Category:Philosophy]]
[[Category:Metaphysics]]
[[Category:Ontology]]