Editing Philosophy Of Mind (section)

== <span style="color: #FFFFFF;">Analyzing</span> ==
{| class="wikitable"
|+ Positions on Consciousness and AI
! Position !! Consciousness is... !! Can AI be conscious? !! Key Argument
|-
| Functionalism || Functional organization || Yes, if right organization || Multiple realizability; substrate independence
|-
| Biological naturalism (Searle) || Causally produced by brain biology || No, in principle || Chinese Room; syntax ≠ semantics
|-
| Higher-order theories || State representing another state || Possibly || HOTs can in principle be implemented artificially
|-
| Illusionism || An introspective illusion || AI could have same "illusion" || Consciousness is a representational construct
|-
| Panpsychism || Fundamental property of matter || Matter already has proto-experience || Combination problem
|}

'''Classic thought experiments''': Mary's room (Jackson): Mary knows all physical facts about color vision but learns something new seeing red — qualia are non-physical. The zombie argument: physically identical beings that lack experience are conceivable; if conceivable, possible; therefore consciousness is not physical. Nagel's bat: "What is it like to be a bat?" — we cannot access bat sonar experience even knowing all its functional properties.
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